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Abstract
We build a dynamic monetary model with two types of electronic money: reserves for transac-
tion between bankers and zero-maturity deposits for transactions in the non-bank private sector.
Using this model, we discuss about unconventional monetary policy during the Great Reces-
sion. Committing to keep the federal funds rate at the zero lower bound for a long time is very
effective in the short run, but it creates deflation and lowers output in the long run. At the time
of raising interest on reserves, if the central bank also commits to target the growth of money
supply in responding to inflation, both output and inflation paths will be smooth. In short, “raise
rate and raise money supply” is a good way to get out of the zero lower bound.
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of Adrian Masters and Michael Jerison.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, money mostly exists in the electronic form. According to data from the Federal
Reserve Bank, the total stock of M1 in Jun 2016 is around USD 3274 billion, consisting of USD
1381 billion in currency and USD 1850 billion in checkable deposits. However, as the world
currency, most US dollar bills are held outside US. Judson (2012) estimates that 60 percent of
US dollar bills are in foreign countries. If we exclude that number from M1 and M2, currency
only accounts for 15 percent of M1, 5 percent of M2 and 4.2 percent of MZM1. In this paper, we
focus on a popular group of e-money issued by commercial banks, including checkable deposits,
saving deposits and money market deposit accounts. Together they account for 80 percent of
M2. For convenience, we call this group as zero-maturity deposits (ZMDs) thereafter.
ZMDs are different from currency in two salient features. First, in nature, currency is an
IOU issued by the central bank while ZMDs are IOUs issued by commercial banks. In the lan-
guage of economics, currency is outside money while ZMDs are inside money. Second, unlike
currency, ZMDs often earn the (positive) nominal interest rate. Banks pay interest for saving
accounts and money market deposit accounts for a long time, but the tricky part are checking ac-
counts. In a perfectly competitive banking market, the interest rate on checkable deposits should
be positive and follow the federal funds rate. However, before 2012, under the Regulation Q,
banks in US were prohibited from paying interest on checking accounts. During this period,
banks still implicitly paid the demand deposit rate under the form of giving gifts or reducing
the cost of additional services to their customers, see Mitchell (1979), Startz (1979), Dotsey
(1983). Becker (1975) estimates that the implicit demand deposit rate in US during 1960-1968
was around 2.64 percent to 3.74 percent.
Since 2012, the Regulation Q has been no longer valid, and most banks are now paying
interest rate on checkable deposits. Data in September 2016 of Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) show that the national average interest on checkable account is 0.04 percent,
on saving account is 0.06 percent. These rates are low as the federal funds rate is near zero. If
the federal funds rate is around 4 percent, these rates are likely from 1 percent to 2 percent. As
1MZM (Money zero maturity) is equal to M2 less small-denomination time deposits plus institutional money
funds.
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a result of that, in the era of electronic money, it is more natural to model money as an interest-
earning money.
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model where currency does not exist. There
are two forms of money in our model: ZMDs and reserves. ZMDs are inside money issued by
commercial banks. They are used for settling transactions between every pair of agents in the
private sector, except between bankers-bankers. In these types of transactions, bankers have to
use reserves- another type of e-money that is issued by the central bank. The amount of ZMDs
banks can issue is restricted by two constraints: the reserves requirement and the capital re-
quirement. In our model, the central bank only controls the level of reserves while the level of
money supply (total amount of ZMDs) depends on the interaction between the central bank, the
commercial banks and the public (Mishkin, 2007).
We use our model to discuss about unconventional monetary policy during the Great Reces-
sion. Here are some key results in our paper:
i. During the normal time, when the central bank controls the federal funds rate by adjusting
the level of reserves, the effect of cutting rate on the economy is nearly identical to the one
founded in the standard New Keynesian model. After the rate goes down, banks lend out
more and create more money, stimulating inflation and investment.
ii. After a shock that makes banks’ capital constraint binding, an interest policy following
Taylor rule is not enough to recover economy quickly. Both output and inflation are lower
than the steady state level for a long time.
iii. A central bank’s large scale asset purchase program (LSAP), with the aim of injecting
money into the economy, is very efficient to deal with the situation when bankers cut loans.
The inflation and output will go up immediately after the program. The byproduct of LSAP
is a huge amount of excess reserves in the banking system (Keister and McAndrews, 2009);
the reserves requirement is no longer binding and interest on reserves (IOR) becomes the
main tool to control the federal funds rate.
iv. After LSAP, the longer the federal funds rate is committed at the lower bound, the bigger
3
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Figure 1: Federal Funds Rate and Personal Consumption Expenditure Index
the positive effect on inflation and output is in the short run, but the lower the inflation and
output are in the long run. As loan has the longer maturity than deposits, commitment to
keep rate near zero for a long time pushes down the loan rate stronger. However, in the long
run, until the endogenous money supply is bounded, the idea in Neo-Fisherism arises, the
short term real rate must go up and the deflation realizes. This matches with the US data
since the Great Recession (Figure 1).
v. At the time when the central bank raises rate (by raising IOR), the amount of banks’ credits
declines, the economy will suffer a short recession, the deflation will be more severe. How-
ever, the inflation will jump back to the target in the long run. Therefore, the central bank
falls into a dilemma between to raise or to not raise rate. In either way, the outcome is not
bright.
vi. When raising rate, if the central bank simultaneously commits to target the growth of money
supply in responding to inflation, the inflation and output path will be stabilized. In the
electronic payment system, the central bank somehow can manipulate both interest rate and
money supply at the same time. These tools should be utilized at the same time so that the
central bank can hit the inflation target better.
Related Literature
On the money supply side, our approach is similar to Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Afonso
and Lagos (2015) when the central bank can increase the level of money supply and cut down
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the federal funds rate by injecting more reserves in the banking system. These papers explicitly
model the search and matching process of heterogeneous agents in the interbank market while
the one in our model is frictionless with identical bankers. In exchange of that, our model can
connect the central bank policy to not only banks’ balance sheet but also the production sector,
which is missing in both Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Afonso and Lagos (2015).
On the money demand side, our model follows the cash-in-advance literature in Lucas and
Stokey (1987). As our model does not have currency, “cash” here should be interpreted as
ZMDs. In Belongia and Ireland (2006, 2014), currency and deposits are bundled together and
provide the liquidity service to households. We also extend the Clower constraint to the in-
vestment (Stockman (1981), Abel (1985), Fuerst (1992), Wang and Wen (2006)). Indeed, most
empirical research, for example Friedman (1959) and Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin (1997), usu-
ally uses the income, rather than the consumption alone, to estimate the money demand function.
We also share the important sticky price feature with the New Keynesian framework. The
important role of financial frictions in the New Keynesian has been emphasized for a long time
(see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004)). Recently,
many New Keynesian research (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Curdia and Woodford (2011),
Gertler and Karadi (2011)) incorporates the banking sector to their models, aiming to answer
what happened in the Great Recession and the role of the unconventional monetary policy. There
is also a large literature discuss about interest on reserves, see Sargent and Wallace (1985),
Goodfriend et al. (2002), Ireland (2014), Cochrane (2014), Keister (2016). Our paper differs
mainly from these line of research in the money supply process. We can characterize the micro-
foundation link between reserves, banks’ balance sheets, money supply and the federal funds
rate while this link is often missing in the New Keynesian literature.
Our approach also relates to Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) where macro shocks can
affect strongly to the balance sheets of intermediaries and the amount of inside money. Both
papers emphasize the importance of inside money in the deflation episode. However, two papers
differ mainly in the role of money and the money supply process. There is no reserves and two-
tier money in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016). Moreover they emphasize the role of storing
value in money while our paper focus on the function as the medium of exchange in money.
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2 The Environment
2.1 Notation:
Let Pt be the price of the final good. We use the lower letter to exhibit the real balance of a
variable or its relative price. For example, the real reserves balance nt = Nt/Pt , or the real price
of pmt = P
m
t /Pt . The timing notation follows this rule: if a variable is determined or chosen at
time t, it will have the subscript t. The gross inflation rate is pit = Pt/Pt−1.
2.2 Time, Demographics and Preferences
Time is discrete, indexed by t and continues forever. The model is in the deterministic setting
and has five types of agents: bankers, households, wholesale firms, retail firms, and the consol-
idated government.
There is a measure one of identical infinitely lived bankers in the economy. Bankers discount
the future with the rate β . Each period, they gain utility from consuming the final consumption
good ct . Their utility at the period t can be written as:
∞
∑
i=0
β i log(ct+i)
There is also a measure one of identical infinitely lived households. Households discount
the future with the rate β˜<β , so they will borrow from bankers in the steady state. Each period,
households gain utility from consuming the final consumption good c˜t and lose utility when
providing labor lt to their own production. Household’s utility at the period t can be written as:
∞
∑
i=0
β˜ i
(
log(c˜t+i)−χ
l1+νt+i
1+ν
)
where ν is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Wholesale firms, retail firms are infinitely lived, owned by households.
The consolidated government includes both the government and the central bank, so for
convenience, we assume there is no independence between the government and the central bank.
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2.3 Goods and Production Technology
There are three types of goods in the economy: final good yt produced by retailers, wholesale
goods yt( j) produced by wholesale firm j and intermediate good ymt produced by households.
Each period households self-employ their labor lt and use the capital kt−1 to produce the
homogeneous intermediate good ymt under the Cobb-Douglas production function:
ymt = k
α
t−1l
1−α
t
where α is the share of capital in the production function. Capital k depreciates with the rate δk.
Households also own a technology to convert one unit of final good yt to one unit of capital type
k and vice versa. So each period they also make an investment it = kt−δkkt−1. Households sell
ymt to wholesale firms in the competitive market with price P
m
t .
There is a continuum of wholesale firms indexed by j∈ [0,1]. Each wholesale firm purchases
the homogeneous intermediate good ymt from households and differentiates it into a distinctive
wholesale goods yt( j) under the following technology:
yt( j) = ymt
Then retail firms produce the final good yt by aggregating a variety of differentiated whole-
sale goods yt( j):
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt( j)
ε−1
ε d j
) ε
ε−1
2.4 Assets
There are three main types of financial assets: bank loans Bht , share of wholesale firms xt and
interbank loans B ft .
(a) Bank loans to households (Bht ) : We follow Leland and Toft (1996) and Bianchi and Bigio
(2014) to model the loan structure between bankers and households. The market for bank
loan is perfectly competitive and the price of loan is qlt . When a household wants to borrow
7
Banker Banker
Loans: +St Deposits: + qltSt Loans: -(1−δb)Bht−1 Deposits: -δbBht−1
Net worth: + (1−qlt)St Net worth: +(2δb−1)Bht−1
Table 1: Banker issues loans (left) and collects loans (right)
1 dollar at time t, bankers will create an account for her and deposit qlt dollars to her account.
In the exchange for that, this household promises to pay δb, δ 2b , ..., δ
n
b , δ
n+1
b ... dollars at
time t + 1, t + 2,... t + n, t + n+ 1... where n runs to infinity (Table 1). Loans are illiquid
and bankers cannot sell loans.
Let Bht be the nominal balance of loan stock in the period t, let St be the nominal flow of
new loan issuance, we have:
Bht = δbB
h
t−1+St
(b) Shares of wholesale firms (xt) : are issued by the wholesale firms. Bankers are not allowed
to hold this share, so they are only traded between households. Each share has a price υt
and pays a real dividend wt . In the LSAP, the central bank might purchase these shares to
inject money into the market.
(c) Interbank loan (B ft ): Bankers can borrow reserves from other bankers in the federal funds
market. The nominal gross interest rate in the federal funds market is the federal funds rate
R ft .
2.5 Money
There are two types of electronic money in our economy: reserves nt and zero-maturity deposits
mt .
(a) Reserve (nt): is a type of e-money issued by the central bank. Only government and bankers
have an account at the central bank, so only government and bankers have reserves2. Each
2The amount of US Treasury deposits at the Fed is not considered as reserves in reality. However, for conve-
nience, we also call that money as reserves in our model. In equilibrium, the balance of the government account at
the central bank is zero, so it does not matter.
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Wholesale firm A Household B
Deposit: -1 Payable:-1 Deposit: +1
Receivable:-1
Bank A Bank B
Reserve: -1 Deposit: -1 Reserve: +1 Deposit: +1
The Fed
Reserve (bank A): -1
Reserve (bank B):+1
Table 2: Electronic Payment System
period, the central bank pays a gross interest rate Rnt on these reserves. The rate R
n
t is
decided solely by the central bank. Reserves are used for settling the transactions between
bankers and bankers, bankers and central bank, bankers and government.
(b) Zero maturity deposit (mt): is a type of e-money issued by the bankers. Each period, banks
pay the interest rate Rmt for these ZMDs which is determined by the perfectly competitive
market. Money mt is used for settling transactions in the non-bank private sector and the
ones between households and bankers. These ZMDs are insured by the central bank, so
they are totally safe. ZMDs and reserves have the same unit of account.
In the electronic payment system, there is a connection between the flows of reserves and de-
posits. For example, we assume that wholesale firm A (whose account at bank A) pays 1 dollar
for household B (whose account at bank B). Then the flow of payment will follow Table (2). For
a transaction between the consolidated government and households, money still flows through
banks, so we can think this contains two sub-transactions. One is between government and
banks, which is settled by reserves. One is between banks and households, which is settled by
ZMDs.
In the conventional monetary policy, the consolidated government targets the interbank rate
by helicopter money or lump-sump tax on households. Each period, the central bank sends τt
dollars in checks to households. It can be thought as a shortcut of the open market operation
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process when the central bank purchases government bonds from the government. Then, the
government transfers the payoffs to households (Table 3). In the fractional reserve banking, the
amount of τt needed to change the federal funds rate is extremely small in comparison to the
total money supply.
The Fed Banks Public
Reserves:+τt Reserves:+τt Deposits: +τt Deposits:+τt Net worth: +τt
Net worth:-τt
Table 3: Helicopter Money
2.6 Timing within one period
(i) Production takes place. Households sell goods to wholesalers, who, in turn, sell goods to
retailers. All of the payments between households-wholesalers, wholesalers-retailer are
delayed until the step (iv).
(ii) The loan market between bankers and households opens.
(iii) The final good market opens. Households need ZMD-in-advance to purchase the final
good from retailers. Bankers create ZMD to purchase the final good from retailer.
(iv) Payments in the non-bank private sector are settled.
(v) The banking market opens. Banker can adjust the level of reserves by borrowing in the
interbank market, receiving new deposits.
3 Agents’ Problems
3.1 Bankers
There is a measure one of identical bankers in the economy. These bankers have to maintain a
good balance sheet under the regulation of the central bank. There are three types of assets on
10
the a banker’s balance sheet: reserves (nt), loans to households (bht ), loan to other bankers (b
f
t ).
His liability side contains the zero-maturity deposits that households deposit here (mt).
Banker
Reserves: nt Zero Maturity Deposits: mt
Loans to households: bht Net worth
Loans to other bankers: b ft
Cost: We assume that the banker faces a cost of managing loan, which is θbht in terms of
final goods.
On the timing of the market, it is worth noting that he can adjust the level of his deposits and
reserves after households and firms pay for each other. When the different parties in the econ-
omy pay each other, he can witness the deposits and reserves outflow from or inflow to his bank.
Let et be the net inflow of deposits and reserves go into his bank, he will treat et exogenously.
When the banking market opens, as the deposit market is perfectly competitive, he can choose
any amount dt of deposit inflows or outflows to his bank.
In each period, the banker treats all the prices as exogenously and choose { ct ,nt ,bht ,st ,mt ,b
f
t ,dt}
to maximize his utility over a stream of consumptions:
max
∞
∑
t=0
β t log(ct)
subject to
Rnt−1nt−1
pit
+
R ft−1b
f
t−1
pit
+dt + et + τt = nt +b ft (Reserve Flows) (1)
mt =
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qLt st +θb
h
t −δb
bht−1
pit
+ ct +dt + et + τt (Deposit Flows) (2)
bht = δb
bht−1
pit
+ st (Loan Flows) (3)
nt ≥ ϕmt (Reserves Requirement) (4)
nt +b
f
t +b
h
t −mt ≥ κtbht (Capital Requirement) (5)
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Banker Banker
Reserves: +dt Deposits: +dt Reserves: - b
f
t
Interbank loan: + b ft
Table 4: The banker takes more deposits (left) and makes interbank loan (right)
Banker Banker
Deposits: +ct Deposits: +θbht
Net worth: - ct Net worth: - θbht
Table 5: The banker pays for his consumption (left) and pays for cost (right)
The equation (1) shows the evolution of reserves in the banker’s balance sheet. After re-
ceiving the interest on reserves, the previous reserve balance becomes Rnt−1nt−1/pit . He also
collects the payment from the interbank loan he lends out to other bankers in the previous pe-
riod R ft−1b
f
t−1/pit . He can also increase his reserves by taking more deposits dt . When doing
that, his reserves and his liability increase by the same amount dt (Table 4). That is the reason
we see dt appear on both the equation (1) and (2). The similar effect can be found on τt when
the central bank drops money. The banker treats τt exogenously. Then, he can leave reserves nt
at the central bank’s account to earn interest rate, or lend reserves to another bankers b ft .
The equation (2) shows the evolution of deposits on his liability side. He makes loans to
households by issuing deposits or creating ZMDs (Table 1). So when he makes a loan (st), the
balance sheet expands. When he collects the payoffs from loans to households (δbbht−1/pit), the
balance sheet shrinks3.
The banker also issues his own ZMDs to purchase the consumption good from retailers (ct)
and to pay for the cost (in terms of final goods) related to lending activities (θbht ) (Table 4). It is
noted that he cannot create infinite amount of money for himself to buy consumption goods as
there exists the capital requirement.
The banker faces two constraints in every period. At the end of each period, he has to hold
3It is assumed that households have to pay loans from the account at the bank they borrow. So if they want to
use money from account at bank B to pay for loans from bank A, they need to transfer deposits from bank B to
bank A first. In fact, this assumption does not matter in equilibrium.
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enough reserves as a fraction of total deposits (4)4. This constraint should be interpreted more
broadly than the the real life reserves requirement in the US because the total ZMDs here in-
clude not only checkable deposits but also saving deposits and money market deposit account.
The second constraint plays the key role in our model - the capital requirement constraint.
The left hand side of (5) is the banker’s net worth (capital), which is equal to total assets minus
total liabilities5. The constraint requires the banker to hold capital greater than a fraction of total
loans in his balance sheet. We assume that κt is a constant κ in the normal time. We later put
the unexpected shock on this κt to reflect the shock in the Great Recession6.
Let γt , µrt and µct be respectively the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the reserves flows,
reserves constraint and the capital constraint. The first order conditions of the banker’s problem
can be written as:
γt =
1
ct
(6)
γt =
βR ft γt+1
pit+1
+µct (7)
γt =
βRmt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +ϕµ
r
t (8)
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +µ
r
t (9)
(qlt +θ)γt =
β [δb+δbqlt+1]γt+1
pit+1
+(1−κt)µct (10)
3.2 Households
There is a measure one of identical households. These self-employed households produce the
homogeneous intermediate good ym to sell to the wholesale firms at the price Pmt , or at the real
relative price pmt . In each period, a household purchases the final good from the retail firms to
consume (c˜t) and make her investment (it).
4During one period, his reserve balance can go temporary negative. But in the end of period, it must be positve
and satisfies the regulation.
5We use the book value Bht rather than the “market value” of loans q
l
tB
h
t in the capital constraint. The reason is
that illiquid bank loans should be treated differently from bonds. In reality, bank loans are often not revalued in the
balance sheet when the interest rate changes.
6Clearly, it is an simplified way to reflect the increase in the bad loans and the reduction in the collateral value
during the Great Recession. In the exchange of that, we can keep our model simple.
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Let B˜ht be the nominal debt stock that she borrows from bankers. Recalling from the section
2.4, each period she only pays a fraction δb of the old debts. We impose an exogenous borrowing
constraint for households with the debt limit b˜ht ≤ bh.
After the loan market, she brings at amount of ZMDs into the final good market. Basically,
she faces the “ZMD-in-advance” constraint when the good market opens. So the amount of
loans she gets from banks will affect her demand for final goods.
In each period, she chooses {c˜t , m˜t , b˜ht , s˜t , it ,kt , lt ,at} to maximize her utility:
max
∞
∑
t=0
β˜ t
(
log(c˜t)−χ l
1+ν
t
1+ν
)
subject to
Loan Market: at +δb
b˜ht−1
pit
=
Rmt−1m˜t−1
pit
+qLt s˜t (11)
ZMD-in-advance: c˜t + it ≤ at (12)
Budget: m˜t + c˜t + it +υt(x˜t− x˜t−1) = at + τt + pmt ymt +wt x˜t−1 (13)
Investment: it = kt− (1−δ )kt−1 (14)
Production: ymt = k
α
t−1l
1−α
t (15)
Loan Flows: b˜ht = δb
b˜ht−1
pit
+ s˜t (16)
Borrowing Constraint: b˜ht ≤ bh (17)
We assume that the household faces an exogenous borrowing constraint, rather than a collat-
eral borrowing constraint like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). Our purpose
is to emphasize that the mechanism of the shock transmission in our model is not related to the
collateral constraint literature. Similar to the capital requirement, we impose the constraint on
the face value of the loan.
Let ηzt , ηbt , λ at be the Lagrangian for the cash-in-advance, borrowing constraint and budget
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constraint. Let λ bt be defined as the sum of η
z
t and λ at .
1
c˜t
= ηzt +λ
a
t = λ
b
t (18)
λ at =
β˜Rmt λ bt+1
pit+1
(19)
qltλ
b
t =
β˜ [δb+δbqLt+1]λ
b
t+1
pit+1
+ηbt (20)
λ bt = β˜ (1−δ )λ bt+1+ β˜α
pmt+1λ
a
t+1y
m
t+1
kt
(21)
χlν+1t = (1−α)pmt ymt λ at (22)
λ at υt = β˜λ
a
t+1(υt+1+wt+1) (23)
As money plays the role of medium of exchange in our model, it’s value contains the liquid-
ity part. In the steady state, the rate of return on money has to be less than 1/β˜ .
The equations (20) and (21) give us the marginal cost and the marginal benefit when the
household borrows one more unit of loans from bankers and when she makes one more unit of
investment. The equation (23) is a common asset pricing equation for the wholesalers’ shares.
3.3 Retail Firms and Wholesale Firms
Follow Rotemberg pricing, we assume that each wholesale firm j faces a cost of adjusting prices,
which is measured in terms of final good and given by:
ι
2
(
Pt( j)
Pt−1( j)
−1
)2
yt
where ι determines the degree of nominal price rigidity. The wholesale firm j discounts the
profit in the future with rate β˜ iλ at+i/λ
a
t . Her real marginal cost is p
m
t .
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms will choose the same price and produce the same
quantity Pt( j) = Pt and yt( j) = yt = ymt . The optimal pricing rule then implies that:
1− ι (pit−1)pit + ιβ˜Et
[
λ at+1
Λat
(pit+1−1)pit+1 yt+1yt
]
= (1− pmt )ε (24)
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3.4 The Central Bank and Government
The consolidated government uses the payoffs from tax or their asset to pay for the interest
on reserves, then injects (drain) τˆt by helicopter money (tax) to target the interbank rate. All
transactions are conducted in the electronic system.
τt =−
(Rnt−1−1)nt−1
pit
+ τˆt (25)
In the conventional monetary policy, we assume that the central bank follows the simple
Taylor rule, fixing Rnt at a constant level Rn. To connect with the common New Keynesian
literature, we assume there is a lower bound for R ft that is greater than Rn, so there is no excess
reserves7. Later, we relax the assumption and examine the situation when the banking system is
awash of excess reserves and the central bank controls the federal funds rate by adjusting Rnt .
In this paper, we assume the inflation target in the long-term of the central bank pi = 1.
Rnt = Rn (26)
R ft = max
{
pi
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+ ε f
}
(27)
4 Equilibrium
Definition: A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of bankers’ decision choice {ct ,nt ,bht ,st ,mt ,
b ft ,dt}, household’s choice {c˜t , b˜ht , s˜t , m˜t , it ,kt , lt ,ymt , x˜t}, the firms’ choice {yt ,wt}, the central
bank’ choice {τt , Rnt }, and the market price {qlt ,R ft ,υt ,pit , pmt } such that:
i Given the market price and the central bank’s choices, banker’s choices solve the banker’s
problem, household’s choices solve the household’s problem, firm’s choice solves the equa-
tion (24).
7When there reserve requirement is no longer binding, Taylor rule is not enough for the determinacy as we need
a rule governing the motion of reserves.
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ii All markets clear:
Net flows of reserves: dt + et = 0
The interbank market: b ft = 0
Total ZMDs: mt = m˜t
Loan Market: bht = b˜
h
t
Wholesalers’ shares: x˜t = 1
Good Market: yt = ct + c˜t + it +θbht +
ι
2
(pit−1)2yt
We make the following assumption to ensure that in the steady state households will borrow
from bankers.
Assumption 1. The discount factor of bankers and households satisfy:
βδb−θpi
pi−βδb >
β˜ δb
pi− β˜ δb
The relationship between the federal funds rate R ft , deposit rate Rmt and interest on reserves
Rnt can be understood under the following theorem:
Theorem 1. In equilibrium:
i The lower bound of federal funds rate is the interest on reserves. In all cases, Rnt ≤ Rmt ≤ R ft
ii When the constraint of reserve requirement is not binding, R ft = Rmt = R
n
t .
There are two benefits of holding reserves for bankers. First, bankers can earn the interest
on reserves that central bank pay for them. Second, it helps bankers satisfy reserve requirement.
The cost of holding reserves is the federal funds rate they give up when they do not lend reserves
in the interbank market. When the banking system has a large amount of excess reserves, the
second benefit vanishes and the federal funds rate must be equal to the interest on reserves.
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Theorem 2. The total level of reserves in equilibrium is decided solely be the central bank:
nt−1
pi
+ τˆt = nt (28)
Bankers themselves cannot change the total level of reserves in the banking system. Lending
or not lending to households will not change the total level of reserves. The appearance of the
huge amount of reserves after the large scale asset purchase is just a byproduct of the central
bank’s policy. Later we will examine this kind of policy. Next we examine some properties of
the steady state.
Theorem 3. Under the Assumption (1) and Rn+ ε f < pi/β , in the steady state where inflation
is equal to the central bank’s inflation target, we have:
i. The banker’s reserves constraint (4), the household’s borrowing constraint (17) and the
ZMD-in-advance constraint (12) are binding.
ii. The banker’s capital constraint (5) is not binding.
5 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Calibration
For the bankers’ parameters, we choose the discount factor β = 0.99 to match with the federal
funds rate of 4% annually before the Great Recession. The reserves requirement is set as the
ratio between reserves and the total ZMDs (including checking account, saving account and
money market deposit account) before the financial crisis, which is around ϕ = 0.002. The
monitoring cost θ and loan amortization δb are set exogenously. The risk weight κ is exoge-
nously set so that 10 percent increase of κ from steady state will make the capital constraint
binding. (Table 6)
Most of the households’ parameters are standard in the literature. The only one that need to
calibrate is the borrowing limit bh. We calibrate it to match with the ratio between total house-
holds’ debts and households’ income before the Great Recession - around 1.3 times. All other
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Table 6: Parameter values
Param. Definition Value
Bankers
β Banker’s discount factor 0.99
ϕ The reserves requirement 0.002
κ The risk weight 0.22
θ The monitoring cost 0.0005
δb Loan amortization 0.5
Households
β˜ Household’s discount factor 0.985
χ Relative Utility Weight of Labor 0.586
ν Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 0.5
bh The borrowing limit 3.4
δk Capital’s depreciation rate 0.025
α Capital share in production function 0.34
Firms
ε Elasticity of substitution of wholesale goods 4
ι Cost of changing price 100
Central bank
φpi Policy respond to inflation 1.25
Rn The constant IOR 1+0.25/400
Rn+ ε f The lower bound for FFR 1+0.5/400
parameters are also in the range which is often seen in the macro literature. We tried using as
few parameters as possible to illustrate the main mechanism of the model.
5.2 Federal funds rate shock
We examine the standard interest rate shock in Taylor rule and compare the mechanism of this
model to the standard one in the New Keynesian literature.
R ft = max
{
1
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
exp(u ft ), Rn+ ε f
}
Rnt = Rn
u ft = ρ f u
f
t−1, u
f
0 is given
(P1)
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From the steady state, there is an unexpected shock at t = 0 with u f0 =−2/400, then agents
know the shock will die slowly with ρ f = 0.6.
Similar to the standard New Keynesian model: As the price is sticky, when the central bank
cut the federal funds rate, the real rate goes down and stimulate the economy in the short run.
(Figure 2)8.
Difference from the standard New Keynesian model:
i Banks play an important role in creating money. After the shock, real money balance in-
creases by 0.45 percent. Most of that is created by banks when they increase loans. The
amount of money that the central bank actually “drops” to the economy τˆ to change the
federal funds rate only accounts for 0.02 percent of this increase. So unlike the standard
model in New Keynesian, our model focuses on the money creation process by commercial
banks and the pass through from the federal funds rate to the loan rate.
ii Without any adjustment cost functions, investment still well-behaves after the cut in the real
interest rate. The constraint for the huge sudden jump of investment comes naturally from
the ZMD-in-advance constraint.
5.3 Financial Crisis - Taylor Rule Response
From the steady state, we illustrate the financial crisis by imposing an unexpected shock at κt
in the capital constraint. The conventional monetary policy still follows the Taylor rule in (26)
and (27).
R ft = max
{
1
β
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+ ε f
}
Rnt = Rn
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
(P2)
where ρk = 0.95 is the persistence of the shock and κ0 = 0.26, which is 18 percent higher than
the one in the steady state level. The response of the economy is illustrated in the Figure 3.
The banking crisis is dangerous as it raises the spread between the prime rate and the federal
8Except the federal funds rate and the real borrowing rate are converted to the annual level, all other figures
show the percentage deviation of a variable from its steady state value.
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funds rate. To satisfy the capital requirement (CR), bankers have to cut loans. Loan rate goes
up even when the federal funds rate is cut down, as the shadow price of capital requirement µct
is positive now.
γt =
β (δb+δbqlt+1)
pit+1(qlt +θ)
γt+1+
(1−κt)µct
qlt +θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spread due to CR’s binding
Money supply eventually drops as the consequence of the debt deleveraging process. The
deflation will be persistent under the Taylor rule as the conventional monetary policy only fo-
cuses on the pass through of federal funds rate to the prime rate, which will not work in this
case.
Standard New Keynesian model emphasizes the importance of monetary policy in correcting
the deviation of real rate from its natural level due the the price stickiness. Under the framework
where the banking sector is modeled clearly, there are two other inefficiencies that monetary
policy can intervene to improve the social welfare. The first inefficiency arises from the binding
of the capital constraints, which freezes the credit market between bankers and households. Sec-
ond, the inefficiency comes from the households’ borrowing constraint itself. Unconventional
monetary policy focuses on the money supply and asset price might be a good remedy for this
situation. We only focus on the money supply in this paper.
5.4 Financial Crisis - Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP)
Now, assume that central bank injects money directly into market by purchasing the wholesale
firms’ share. Let xt be the number of shares that central bank decides to hold at time t and
∆xt = xt−xt−1 be the additional number of shares the central bank purchases at time t. Recall υt
be the share’s price. When the central bank make transactions with households, in the electronic
system, the flow of money will follow the Table 7.
Before time 0, xt = 0. At time 0, there is unexpected shock for large scale asset purchasing
program to respond to the unexpected shock on κ , then the central bank will slowly sell these
assets back to the market. In equilibrium, the equations for reserve flows and deposit flows
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The Fed Bankers Households
Securities: +υt∆xt Reserves: +υt∆xt Reserves:+υt∆xt Deposits: +υt∆xt Deposits: +υt∆xt
Securities: - υt∆xt
Table 7: Central Bank’s Asset Purchase
become:
nt−1
pit
= nt +υt(xt− xt−1) (29)
mt =
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qLt st +θtb
h
t −δb
bht−1
pit
+ ct +υt(xt− xt−1)− (Rnt−1−1)
nt−1
pit
(30)
The exogenous shock for κt and monetary policy rule are:
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
xt = ρxxt−1, x0 is given
τˆt = 0, Rnt = Rn, ∀t ≥ 0
(P3)
where ρx = 0.98 be the persistence of the asset purchasing shock and x0 = 0.0008. We assume
that the central bank does not follow Taylor rule anymore. They still fixes the interest on reserves
at a constant level Rn and only uses that asset purchase/sale program to adjust money supply
τˆ = 0. Figure 4 shows the reaction of the economy to this monetary policy.
Here are some important remark for LSAP’s effect:
i The excess reserves skyrockets and the long duration of the federal funds rate at the lower
bound: When the central bank purchases asset from the private sector, they inject simulta-
neously money supply and reserves. When the level of reserves increases by 700 percent,
the reserve constraint is no longer binding, µrt = 0. As we assume that the central bank fixes
Rn at a constant level, it is synonymous that the federal funds rate will be at the lower bound
for a long time, around 25 years (100 quarters) in our model.
ii Positive effect in the short-run: As new money is injected and the long duration of the
federal funds rate at the lower bound, the economy does not even go through recession like
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the case with Taylor rule. As the loan has the longer maturity than deposits, if the central
bank commits to let the federal funds rate at the low level for a long time, the real borrowing
rate will decline sharply. It combines with the relaxation of liquidity constraint, stimulating
the household’s demand and pushing up the inflation and outputs.
iii Negative effect in the long-run: After inflation jumps up in the short run, it starts declining,
below the central bank’s target. This phenomenon can be explained by the Neo-Fisherian’s
idea. In the long run, real short-term rate will be back to the long-term level. As R ft = Rn,
the deflation must realize to increase R ft /pit+1.
5.5 Interest on Reserves (IOR) as Monetary Policy Tool
5.5.1 IOR: To raise or not to raise?
In the previous section, we know that after the LSAP program without adjusting Rnt , the inflation
- the central bank’s main target - is high in the short run but below the target in the long-run.
How long should the central bank keep the federal funds rate at the zero lower bound? And if
the central bank decides to raise rate, what is the best strategy for the central bank?
In this section, we still conduct the experiment similar to the previous section with one twist.
We assume that after Tu periods, the central bank will raise IOR and after Td periods, IOR will
be brought back to the initial level. We choose the different level for Tu at 20, 40 and 80 quarters
to see the effect of the zero lower bound duration on outputs and inflation in the short run and
long run. Td is chosen at 200 quarters.
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
xt = ρxxt−1, x0 is given
τˆt = 0, ∀t ≥ 0
Rnt =

Rn if t < Tu
1/β if Tu ≤ t ≤ Td
Rn if t > Td
(P4)
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Here are some remarks from our experiments: (Figure 5)
i. The longer is the duration of the federal funds rate at the lower bound, the bigger is the
positive effect on output and inflation in the short run. This effect is well-documented
in the New Keynesian literature when the central bank commits to set the short-term at
the zero lower bound for a long time ( Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) ). However, the
hyperinflation never happens in our model even with 20 years at the lower bound. Due to
the household’s borrowing constraint and banker’s capital constraint, the amount of money
supply is restricted even with the huge amount of excess reserves in the banking system.
ii. The longer is the duration of the federal funds rate at the lower bound, the bigger is the
negative effect on output and deflation in the long run.
iii. The endogenous money supply drops sharply at the time the central bank raises rate, im-
plying the deflation will be severe at that moment. Therefore, if the central bank raises rate,
the economy suffer a short recession but the outcome is better in the long run.
The last point implies an important hint for monetary policy when the central bank decides to
raise rate. The central bank can still stabilize the inflation and demand if they commit to a rule
of targeting money supply at the time of raising rate. The appearance of interest on reserves
and electronic payment system allow the central bank to manipulate both the money supply and
interest rate at the short run, which is very different from Keynesian theory with only paper
money. In this sense, our research is very near to the Monetarism when the growth of money
supply always decides the inflation path in the long run.
5.5.2 Raise rate and raise money supply - Money Supply Rule
We do an experiment similar to (P4) but at the time of raising IOR, the central bank also commits
to a money supply rule (massive helicopter money if necessary) to target the inflation rate. The
money supply rule simply responds to the deviation of the inflation rate from its target:
Mt
Mt−1
=
(
pi
pit
)ρm
(31)
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where ρm = 0.5 is the coefficient showing how much the central bank will change the growth
rate of money supply to respond to inflation.
To create the same interest path like the previous section, we assume this money supply rules
only applies since the time the central bank decides to raise rate. The complete list of exogenous
shocks and monetary policy for this experiment can be written as follows:
κt = ρκκt−1+(1−ρκ)κ, κ0 is given
xt = ρxxt−1, x0 is given
τˆt = 0 if t < Tu
log(mt)− log(mt−1) =−(1+ρm) log(pit) if t ≥ Tu
Rnt =

Rn if t < Tu
1/β if Tu ≤ t ≤ Td
Rn if t > Td
(P5)
Figure 6, by comparing (P5) to (P4), shows the effectiveness of combining raise rate with
the rule of targeting money supply:
i. Even though the federal funds rate paths are nearly identical in the first 200 periods in our
experiments, the dynamics of output and inflation are very different. It implies that interest
rate path does not give enough information for the stance of monetary policy when central
bank use IOR as the main tool. When there is no excess reserves, federal funds rate path
conveys all information about monetary policy. It is not this case with the current situation,
when the central bank can manipulate both money supply and interest rate.
ii. Money supply targeting is extremely efficient in stabilizing inflation and output. The infla-
tion is anchored at the target rate since the time the central bank target money supply in our
model.
iii. At the time of raising rate (period 20), to stabilize the inflation and avoid a severe short
recession, money supply targeting implies that the central bank should conduct a massive
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helicopter money. With this commitment, the central bank can anchor the household’s
expectation about inflation path and get out of the dilemma to raise or not to raise rate.
6 Conclusion
Our research shows that, when the central bank controls the federal funds rate by adjusting in-
terest on reserves, the interest path does not provide full information on the stance of monetary
policy. The endogenous money supply can complete go down when the federal funds rate is
near zero for a long time. However, if the central bank simply raises rate, the economy will fall
into a short recession and deflation is worse in the short run. Basically, the central bank falls
into a dilemma to raise or not to raise rate, where outcome is not bright in either way.
One feasible solution for the central bank is to target the growth of money supply in re-
sponding to inflation when they raise rate. With that, they can completely avoid the negative
short term effect and do a better job in hitting the inflation target.
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A Mathematical Appendiz
Proof for Theorem 1:
From the first order condition of bankers’ problem, we have:
γt =
βR ft γt+1
pit+1
+µct (A.1)
γt =
βRmt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +ϕµ
r
t (A.2)
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +µ
r
t (A.3)
As µct and µrt are non-negative shadow price of capital constraint and reserve constraint, γt > 0
as ct > 0, we have Rnt ≤ Rmt ≤ R ft .
The ′′ =′′ happens when µrt = 0, or when the reserver requirement is no longer binding.
Proof for Theorem 2:
The equation for reserves flow (1) is:
Rnt−1nt−1
pit
+
R ft−1b
f
t−1
pit
+dt + et + τt = nt +b ft
In equilibrium, b ft = 0, dt + et = 0 and from (25):
τt =−
(Rnt−1−1)nt−1
pit
+ τˆt
Substitute that into the reserves flow:
nt−1
pit
+ τˆt = nt
So the total level of reserves only depend on τˆ , which is decided solely be the central bank.
Proof for Theorem 3:
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In the steady state where pit = pi , from (27), we have:
R f = max{pi/β ,Rn+ ε f } (A.4)
Under the assumption Rn+ε f < 1/β , we get R f = pi/β . The equation (A.1) can be rewritten in
the steady state as:
γ =
βR f γ
pi
+µc
When R f = pi/β , we get µc = 0, the capital constraint is not binding. As R f > Rn, from the
Theorem 1, µr > 0, or the reserve requirement is binding.
When mc = 0, from (10), at the steady state:
ql =
βδb−θpi
pi−βδb (A.5)
Under the Assumption (1) and (20), at the steady state, ηb > 0, so the borrowing constraint is
binding.
As µr > 0, we get Rm < R f = pi/β . From (18) and (19), at the steady state, ηz > 0, so the
ZMD-in-advance constraint is binding.
B System of Equations in Equilibrium
Bankers:
γt =
1
ct
(B.1)
γt =
βR ft γt+1
pit+1
+µct (B.2)
γt =
βRmt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +ϕµ
r
t (B.3)
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +µ
r
t (B.4)
(qlt +θ)γt =
β [δb+δbqlt+1]γt+1
pit+1
+(1−κt)µct (B.5)
nt−1
pit
+ τˆt = nt (B.6)
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mt =
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qLt st +θtb
h
t −δb
bht−1
pit
+ ct + τˆt− (Rnt−1−1)
nt−1
pit
(B.7)
µrt ⊥ (nt−ϕmt) (B.8)
µct ⊥
(
nt +(1−κt)bht −mt
)
(B.9)
bht = δb
bht−1
pi
+ st (B.10)
Households:
1
c˜t
= ηzt +λ
a
t (B.11)
1
c˜t
= λ bt (B.12)
λ at =
β˜Rmt λ bt+1
pit+1
(B.13)
qltλ
b
t =
β˜ [δb+δbqLt+1]λ
b
t+1
pit+1
+ηbt (B.14)
λ bt = β˜ (1−δ )λ bt+1+ β˜α
pmt+1λ
a
t+1yt+1
kt
(B.15)
χlν+1t = (1−α)pmt ytλ at (B.16)
ηzt ⊥
(
Rmt−1mt−1
pit
+qLt st− c˜t− it−δb
bht−1
pit
)
(B.17)
ηbt ⊥
(
bh−bht
)
(B.18)
Firms:
1− ι (pit−1)pit + ιβ˜
λ at+1
Λat
(pit+1−1)pit+1 yt+1yt = (1− p
m
t )ε (B.19)
yt = kαt−1l
1−α
t (B.20)
Central bank:
R ft = max
{
R f
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
, Rn+ ε f
}
(B.21)
Rnt = Rn (B.22)
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Markets Clear:
yt = ct + c˜t + it +θbht +
γ
2
(pit−1)2 yt (B.23)
kt = (1−δ )kt−1+ it (B.24)
C Numerical Method
C.1 Inequalities Constraints
There are 5 occasionally binding inequality constraints in our model: the reserve requirement,
the capital requirement, the ZMD-in-advance, the household’s borrowing constraint and the
Taylor rule of the central bank.
For the reserve requirement and the ZMD-in-advance, we apply the method in Zangwill and
Garcia (1981) and Schmedders, Judd and Kubler (2002) to transform the inequality constraints
into the equality constraints. Here is an example for the reserve requirement:
nt−ϕmt = max{−µrt ,0}
2
γt =
βRnt γt+1
pit+1
+µct +max{µrt ,0}
2
For the capital requirement and the household’s borrowing constraint, we apply the penalty
method in McGrattan (1996) to avoid the ill-conditioned of the system and deal with occasion-
ally binding constraints. So the utility of banker and the capital constraint will be changed as:
U = logct− ρe3 max{µ
c
t
,0}3
nt +b
f
t +(1−κt)bht −mt =−µct
where ρe = 1000 is the penalty coefficient. When the capital constraint is violated, banker will
lose the utility. However, when they get positive net worth, they do not get reward for that. The
household’s utility also is changed to deal with the borrowing constraint.
For the Taylor rule of the central bank, we use the soft max constraint to deal with the lower
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bound on R fmin = Rn+ ε f so we can still take derivative to solve the system of equations:
ut = R f
(pit+1
pi
)φpi
R ft =
ut +
log(1+exp(smax(R
f
min−ut)))
smax
, if ut ≥ R fmin
R fmin+
log(1+exp(smax(ut−R fmin)))
smax
, if ut < R
f
min
When smax→ ∞, the soft max constraint converges to the hard max constraint. We choose the
coefficient smax = 1e4.
C.2 Dynamic of Economy
We solve the perfect foresight equilibrium with the unexpected shock by assuming that after
T = 300 quarters, the economy will converge back to the initial steady state. The initial position
before the unexpected shocks is the steady state. Basically, we need to solve a large system
of equations to determine the dynamic path of the economy. The transform of occasionally
inequality constraints in the previous section ensures that every equation is continuous and dif-
ferentiable.
For every application, we use homotopy method for solving this large system of equation,
with the initial point starting from the steady state or the previous result. We use Ipopt written
by Wachter and Biegler (2006) with the linear solver HSL9 to conduct homotopy.
9HSL. A collection of Fortran codes for large scale scientific computation. http://www.hsl.rl.ac.uk/
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